Suppose each of k ≤ n o(1) players holds an n-bit number x i in its hand. The players wish to determine if i≤k x i = s. We give a public-coin protocol with error 1% and communication O(k lg k). The communication bound is independent of n, and for k ≥ 3 improves on the O(k lg n) bound by Nisan (Bolyai Soc. Math. Studies; 1993).
Introduction
We have been unable to prove a stronger lower bound even for simultaneous protocols. We have also been unable to prove an ω(k) lower bound for general protocols. We note that our protocol for Sum-Equal is simultaneous, and in it every player communicates O(lg k/ ) bits.
Pseudorandom functions.
As an application of the previous Theorem 5, we show that truth-tables of poly(n)-size constant-depth AC 0 circuits augmented with O(1) threshold gates cannot support cryptographic pseudorandom functions. Introduced in the seminal work [GGM86] of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali, a pseudorandom function is a random function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} such that for every c and sufficiently large n, any oracle algorithm M running time ≤ n c has advantage ≤ 1/n c in distinguishing F from a uniform random function from n bits to 1 bit. A threshold gate is a gate that computes a degree-1 polynomial-threshold function.
Our impossibility result generalizes the one by Linial, Mansour, and Nisan [LMN93] that applies to AC 0 circuits. We mention that the distinguisher in [LMN93] is simpler than ours. Our impossibility result also complements the well-known candidate pseudorandom functions by Naor and Reingold [NR04] , which are computable by poly(n)-size, constant-depth AC 0 circuits augmented with poly(n) threshold gates, a.k.a. TC 0 circuits. (Cf. [GHR92] for the equivalence between threshold and majority gates.)
In fact our impossibility result also applies to circuits augmented with O(1) arbitrary symmetric gates, such as parity or majority. (For this, previous communication lower bounds suffice.) In the case of a single majority gate, this improves on the quasipolynomial-time distinguisher by Razborov and Rudich [RR97] , based on [ABFR94] ; cf. [KL01] .
Theorem 10. Let F be a distribution on functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} such that each function in the support is computable by a circuit of size n d , depth d, with d threshold (or arbitrary symmetric) gates, where d is a constant and n is sufficiently large.
Then there is a randomized, oracle algorithm D that runs in time n b such that
where b depends on d only, and U is a uniform function on n bits.
Motivated by the result above, we ask how far one can push poly-time distinguishers. The papers [RR97, KL01] also give a quasipolynomial-time distinguisher for AC 0 circuits with (unboundedly many) Mod m gates. We show that in this model the running time cannot be improved to polynomial. This holds under standard cryptographic assumptions, such as the "2 n -factoring assumption" which is reviewed later, and essentially says that one cannot factor n-bit Blum integers in time < 2 n .
Theorem 11. Assume there is an > 0 such that the 2 n -factoring assumption holds. Then for every m, c, there is a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} computable by poly(n)-size AC 0 circuits with Mod m gates such that adversaries running in time t(n) := 2 lg c n ≥ n ω(1) have advantage 1/t(n) in distinguishing F from uniform.
The results on pseudorandom functions are summarized in Table 1 . Secure against time t = t(n) under assumptions in [NR04] against times poly(n)t(n) Organization In §2 we give an overview of our techniques. The communication upper bounds for Sum-Equal, Sum-Greater, and polynomial-threshold functions are proved in §3. In that section we also prove an upper bound of a more technical nature, concerning computing Sum-Equal in the number-on-forehead model under an arbitrary partition. The lower bounds for Sum-Greater and Sum-Equal are in §4. The results about pseudorandom functions are in §5.
Overview of techniques
Sum-Equal. We now discuss our Sum-Equal protocol, for simplicity in the case where the sum is modulo 2 n . The key idea is to use a family of hash functions h : Z 2 n → Z 2 r analyzed in the work [DHKP97, §2.2] by Dietzfelbinger, Hagerup, Katajainen, and Penttonen. On input x and seed a, the hash function outputs certain r bits of the product a · x over the integers. The protocol works as follows. Using the public randomness, the players agree on a hash function mapping n bits to r := O(lg k/ ). Player i then communicates y i := h(x i ). One accepts if y i − h(s) is close to 0, that is if y i − h(s) ∈ {−k + 1, −k + 2, . . . , 0}. The properties that are used of h are:
1. almost linearity: ∀x, y : h(x) + h(y) = h(x + y) − b for some b ∈ {0, 1}, 2. ∀z = 0, h(z) is unlikely to land around 0, that is, in the set {−k, −k + 1, . . . , k}.
In the case x i = s, by applying (1) several times, we see that the protocol accepts.
In the case
x i = z = s, by (1) the protocol accepts only if h( x i − s) = h(z) lands around 0. By (2) this is unlikely. This concludes the overview of our protocol for Sum-Equal.
It is instructive to compare the above hash function h with the hash function used in [Nis93] , which amounts to taking each number modulo a small prime p. The latter is linear, but p must be n Ω(1) regardless of the target error, resulting in lg n-bit hashes. With h, we give up linearity and only have almost-linearity, but we can trade more accurately the size of the hashes with the error.
Given the many applications of taking numbers modulo small primes in complexity theory, especially "low-level" complexity, one may hope that the hash function h may find more applications. It works well when summing few, large numbers.
Sum-Greater. Our k-player Sum-Greater protocol builds on protocols by Nisan and Safra in [Nis93] . To explain our contribution, in the next paragraphs we discuss:
(1) a sub-optimal protocol with communication O(lg n) lg lg n, obtained by combining [Nis93] and our Sum-Equal protocol, (2) an additional idea by Nisan and Safra that reduces the communication to O(lg n) in the special case k = 2, (3) the obstacle to utilizing the additional idea to the setting k ≥ 3, and finally (4) our protocol with communication O(lg n) for any k. For simplicity we focus on the case of constant k and error, and non-negative x i , s ∈ {0, 1} n .
(1) in [Nis93] it is shown how to reduce an instance i x i > ? s where the x i have n bits to another instance i x i > ? s where the x i have n/2 bits. This gives a recursive protocol with recursion depth O(lg n). Each reduction involves solving k − 1 Sum-Equal problems. For this, one can use a randomized protocol for k-player Sum-Equal with error . To withstand the possible accumulation of the error in the lg n reductions, a naive implementation requires ≤ 1/ lg n. Plugging our protocol for k-player Sum-Equal results in a protocol for SumGreater with communication O(lg n) lg lg n.
(2) The special case k = 2 is simplified by the fact that 2-player Sum-Equal reduces easily to equality of x 1 and s − x 2 . It turns out that this makes the recursive protocol in (1) correspond to a binary search for the most significant bit where x 1 and s − x 2 differ. Again, each comparison during this binary search corresponds to a 2-player Sum-Equal problem. If instead of solving these problems with error ≤ 1/ lg n one solves them with a larger, constant error, then one is in the setting of performing binary search with noisy comparisons. For a recent account of the latter, and the many solutions available, we refer the reader to [BOH08] . Nisan and Safra use the cute random-walk-with-backtrack algorithm by Feige, Raghavan, Peleg, and Upfal [FRPU94] . The algorithm [FRPU94] shows that such a search can be accomplished with O(lg n) comparisons. The idea is to start each recursive call with a check that the target element is contained in the current interval, and if not backtrack. This yields an O(lg n) protocol for 2-player Sum-Greater.
(3) For k > 3 the situation is more complex because we actually have to deal with sums and carries. The above protocol (1) does not correspond anymore to performing binary search for the most significant bit where i≤k x i and s (or i<k and s − x k ) differ: the transcript of the protocol does not determine that bit. (This is proved at the end of §3.2.) (4) Our O(lg n) protocol for any k. We show that the ideas in [FRPU94] can be modified to again execute Nisan's protocol while solving the Sum-Equal problems with error as large as constant. At a high level, our approach is similar to [FRPU94] : we start each recursive call with a check that all answers along the current branch of the recursion tree are correct; and if they are not, we backtrack. But at a lower level, our approach is new and crucially exploits two things that are specific to our setting. First, we exploit that our protocol for SumEqual has no false negatives, so any Sum-Equal question that was answered negatively is correct. It remains to verify all the questions that were answered affirmatively. This means that we have some equations of the form i≤k y j i = u j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , and we need to check if all of them are correct. We use the simple fact that this reduces to solving a single Sum-Equal question. For example write each number in one digit over a sufficiently large basis. Alternatively, check the sum of a random subset of the equations. We pay O(1) communication per check, and walk for O(lg n) steps, resulting in an O(lg n)-communication protocol.
Lower bounds. The high-level strategy of the proofs of our lower bounds is the same, and standard. We define two distributions: G (for good) and B (for bad) so that any correct, randomized protocol satisfies, say,
By an averaging argument, there is a deterministic protocol Π that maintains the same probability gap. Our proofs show that the latter is impossible.
To prove this impossibility, we use the standard fact that any k-player, deterministic protocol with communication ≤ c partitions the inputs in C ≤ 2 c monochromatic rectangles
("Monochromatic" means that the output of the protocol is constant.) We then show that for each large rectangle R we have
Summing over rectangles we contradict Equation (1). For a k-tuple T such as R, G, or B, we use the notation T i for the i-th coordinate, and T −k for all coordinates but the k-th.
To show Equation (2) we bound the statistical distance between the distributions
In each case we use the fact that since R is large we are conditioning over a noticeable event. The definitions of G and B, and the associated arguments to prove the statistical closeness of G k and B k , are the main novelty in our proofs. They depend on the problem.
2-player Sum-Greater. For simplicity we prove a lower bound for deciding if x 1 ≥ x 2 (as opposed to x 1 > −x 2 ). We define G and B as follows. G 1 and B 1 are a uniform n-bit integer. G 2 is obtained from G 1 by selecting a random index i ∈ [n], and by setting all bits less significant than the i-th to 0. B 2 is obtained similarly from B 1 , but in addition the i-th bit is flipped. In other words, if G 1 = B 1 = X 1 X 2 . . . X n , where X 1 is the most significant bit, and if we choose the same i for both G 2 and B 2 , we can write
It is easy to check that G 1 ≥ G 2 always, but B 1 ≥ B 2 with probability 1/2. Using the fact that the bits less significant than the i-th are set to 0 in both G 2 and B 2 , and that the bits more significant the the i-th are the same, we prove that the distance between B 2 and G 2 is at most the probability of predicting X i given the prefix X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X i−1 . Since we are conditioning over G 1 ∈ R 1 , which w.l.o.g. has probability ≥ 1/n γ for a small γ, we can bound this prediction probability for a typical i, using the chain rule of entropy in a fashion similar to [Vio09, SV10] .
k-player Sum-Equal modulo a prime p. Here we simply define G i and B i to be uniform and independent in Z p . Then we define
We show both G k and B k are the sum of Ω(k) independent variables. For p = Θ(k 1/4 ), we use a relatively standard fourier argument to show that G k and B k are both close to the uniform distribution, with error exponentially small in k.
k-player Sum-Equal modulo 2 n . For this the previous argument does not work, as the players could just communicate the parity of theirs bits.
We again define G i and B i to be uniform and independent in Z 2 n . But then we define
Again we show that both G k and B k are the sum of Ω(k) independent variables. We then show both are close to a distribution over Z 2 n whose most significant bits are uniform. To any such distribution, adding 2 n−1 , which amounts to flipping the most significant bit, is immaterial. Hence G k and B k are close.
k-player Sum-Equal over the integers. For this the previous arguments do not work, as the players could just communicate their numbers modulo a small prime.
We define G i and B i to be uniform and independent in a small range {1, . . . , a} for a = Θ(lg k). Then we define
Again we show that both G k and B k are the sum of Ω(k) independent variables. This allows us to write (after appropriate conditioning)
where b and m are fixed, m ≤ a, and S is a binomial distribution.
By using the shift-invariance of binomial distributions, we note that S is close to S +t/m. Hence we derive:
yielding the desired closeness.
The error incurred by the use of shift-invariance is (only) polynomial in k. This prevents us from summing over all rectangles of a general protocol. But we show that the rectangles corresponding to sententious protocols have additional structure which allows us to sum.
Pseudorandom functions. We now explain the ideas behind our poly(n)-time distinguisher for functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} computed by poly(n)-size AC 0 circuits augmented with 1 threshold gate.
The main idea in the proof is to use a quantity R k (f ) which measures the correlation between the function f and k-player number-on-forehead protocols. In this section all protocols are number-on-forehead. The quantity R k (f ) is implicit in the seminal work [BNS92] by Babai, Nisan, and Szegedy, and was later made explicit in a series of works [CT93, Raz00, VW08] . We use the notation and results from the latter. Specifically, we use that (1) R k (f ) is exponentially small for random functions, while
The distinguisher D hits the oracle with a random restriction (cf. [FSS84, Hås87] ), it then computes an approximation of R k up to an additive polynomial error, and accepts if it is large. This takes polynomial time.
In the pseudorandom case, after being hit by the restriction, the circuit collapses to a polynomial-threshold function of constant degree. By Theorem 4, a protocol with k = O(1) players can compute the restricted circuit (under any partition of the input) using communication O(lg n) and error 1%. Hence by (2) R k ≥ 1/poly(n).
In the random case, just note that a restricted random function is still random, and use (1).
This concludes the overview of the proof in the case where the circuit is augmented with a single threshold gate. We mention that using this proof but plugging the previous O(lg 2 n) bound on the communication complexity of Sum-Greater from [Nis93] one gets a distinguisher running in time n O(lg n) instead of n O(1) . To handle more threshold gates we still show that with high probability the restricted circuit is computable by a low-communication protocol, using an idea from [Vio07] . We note that the result [Bei94] of Beigel shows that O(1) symmetric gates can be reduced to 1 with only a polynomial blow-up. However no equivalent of Beigel's result holds even for two threshold gates, as was shown by Gopalan and Servedio in [GS10] .
Upper bounds
In this section we prove our upper bounds for Sum-Equal, Sum-Greater, and polynomialthreshold functions.
Sum-Equal
We define the hash function originating in the work [DHKP97, §2.2] by Dietzfelbinger, Hagerup, Katajainen, and Penttonen.
Definition 12 ( §2.2 in [DHKP97] ). The hash function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} r has a seed of n − 1 bits and is defined as follows. Interpret the seed as an odd integer a ∈ {0, 1}
n . Then
Here (a · x mod 2 n ) is multiplication modulo 2 n , (i.e., multiply as integers but only keep the n least significant bits) and n − r amounts to taking the r most significant bits of (a · x mod 2 n ).
n − r) mod 2 r , where the product a · x is over the integers.
So the hash function outputs a fixed subset of r bits of the product a · x over the integers.
Notation. The domain and range of the hash function are identified with the groups Z 2 n and Z 2 r respectively. Operations are interpreted accordingly. For example, h a (x + y) + 1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} means that the sum x + y is over Z 2 n , the sum h a (x + y) + 1 is over Z 2 r , and the membership ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is over Z 2 r . The latter means that elements are interpreted modulo 2 r .
The next lemma is essentially from [DHKP97, §2.2]. However for our protocol we need somewhat different properties than those used in that work.
Lemma 13. The hash function in Definition 12 satisfies the following:
(1) For every seed a, and for every x, y ∈ {0, 1} n :
n , y = 0, and every
Proof: (1.1) Write h a (x) as (ax n−r) mod 2 r , where the product ax is over the integers. Note that for either t = 0 or t = 1 we have
since all we can lose is one carry bit. The result follows by taking modulo 2 r . (1.2) Follows from (1.1) by replacing x with x − y.
When a is a uniform odd integer ∈ {0, 1} n , so is ab Mod 2 n . Hence (ab mod 2 n−c ) is a uniform odd integer ∈ {0, 1} n−c . Hence (ab mod 2 n−c ) c is an n-bit string of the regular-expression form U 10 c , where U is a uniform (n − c − 1)-bit string. The output consists of the r most significant bits of this string. If these contain s > lg t of the c low-order zeros, then the output ∈ B := {−t, −t + 1, . . . , 0, 1, 2, . . . , t} with probability 0. This is because from an r-bit string of the regular-expression form u10 s we cannot reach 0 mod 2 r by subtracting less than 2 s > t, nor by adding less than 2 s > t. Otherwise, it contains ≥ r − lg t − 1 uniform bits. By a union bound, the probability of falling in B, a set of size O(t), is
For concreteness, we define all variants of Sum-Equal we study.
Definition 14. In the k-player Sum-Equal problem over Z, each of k players knows an integer number x i of magnitude |x i | < 2 n . The players want to determine if i≤k x i = s. Both n and s, and a public random string, are known to all players.
In the k-player Sum-Equal problem over Z m , each of k players knows an element x i ∈ Z m . The players want to determine if i≤k x i = s, where s ∈ Z m and the summation is in Z m . Both m and s, and a public random string, are known to all players.
Theorem 15. The k-player Sum-Equal problem has a randomized communication protocol with error and communication O(k lg(k/ )), both over Z for any n and over Z m for any m. Moreover, the protocol has one-sided error with no false negatives.
Proof: We first show the protocol over Z m for m a power of 2, then over Z, and finally over Z m for any m.
Over Z m for m = 2 n . The players use the public randomness to agree on a hash function h a with a suitable range of r = lg(k O(1) / ) bits. Player i on input x i then broadcasts the value y i = h a (x i ). A referee may then accept if
By definition this protocol has communication kr = O(k lg(k/ )). We now claim this protocol has error , and no false negative.
Indeed, if x i = s, then, by applying Lemma 13.(1.1) k − 1 times we have that y i = h( x i ) − t = h(s) − t for some t ∈ {0, −1, . . . , −k + 1}, and thus the referee always accepts.
Otherwise, if
Pr[
Over Z. It is easy to reduce to the case in which both the x i and s are not negative, n -bit numbers, by having each player privately add to its input an appropriate quantity that depends only on n and s.
On input x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ {0, 1} n , and for common s ∈ {0, 1} n , the players run the protocol for sum in Z m for m = 2 n where n ≥ n lg k. Since the sum is ≤ (2 n − 1)k < 2 n , this works.
Over Z m for any m. Each player i communicates an integer a i that is within < m/2k of x i . Discretizing, this costs O(lg k) bits per player. Let A := i a i , and let M be the multiple of m that is closest to A − s. The players run the protocol for
To see that the protocol is correct, first note that if
Conversely, start by noting that | (
and so t = 0. Hence,
Note that in all variants the protocol remains simultaneous, and the referee is the only one who needs to know s.
Sum-Greater
In this section we prove our upper bound for Sum-Greater:
Theorem 4. The k-player Sum-Greater problem has a randomized communication protocol with error and communication O(lg n/ )k lg k.
Proof of Theorem 4:
It is easy to see that we can reduce to the case of non-negative integers with O(n) bits. So we assume that all the x i are in {0, 1} n and s ≥ 0. To describe one reduction the following definition and result help.
Definition 16. The problem carry matters (CM ) on input y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ {0, 1} n and t is the problem of computing h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 2} such that
or if no such h exists computing h =⊥. This output is denoted CM (y 1 , . . . , y k , t). Here Player i knows y i . Both t and n are known to all players.
The next claim saves a factor k over repeating our protocol for Sum-Equal many times.
Claim 17. CM (y 1 , . . . , y k , t) can be solved by a k-player protocol with communication O(k lg k) with error 1%. Moreover, when the protocol outputs ⊥, it is always correct.
Proof: The players essentially run the protocol for Sum-Equal with error 1%/k, which takes communication O(k lg k). More specifically, the players agree on a hash function family h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} r , where n is large enough so that | y i − (t − h)| < 2 n for any h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 2}, and the range is r = O(lg k) to guarantee error probability 1%/k in Lemma 13.(2) (where the "t" in that lemma is the current k). For a public random a, Player i sends h a (y i ). The protocol then outputs the first h ∈ {0, 1, . .
and ⊥ if there is no such h.
Let z be the (random) output of the protocol on the instance (y 1 , . . . , y k , t) Let also CM (y 1 , . . . , y k , t) = h.
Note h =⊥⇒ z =⊥, by Lemma 13.(1.1). So when the protocol outputs ⊥ it is correct. When h =⊥, there still is some probability that z = h = h. But this probability is ≤ k1%/k ≤ 1% by Lemma 13.(1-2) and a union bound, similarly to the analysis of the Sum-Equal protocol.
Finally, a similar analysis shows that if h =⊥ then the probability that z =⊥ is ≤ 1%.
We now describe one reduction in the protocol. Suppose the current Sum-Greater instance is i≤k x i > ? s where the x i have n bits. We denote by x L i the least significant n/2 bits of x i , and by x M i the most significant n/2 bits of x i . We also denote by s L the least significant n/2 bits of s, and by s M all the other bits. We note that s M may consist of more than n/2 bits. We also note that the range of the · M and · L operations depends on the bit-length of the x i corresponding to the instance we are dealing with. However we refrain from indicating the range in the notation to avoid clutter.
First the players solve the problem
We refer to this problem as the CM problem associated with the Sum-Greater
Here correctness follows from the fact that the carry from x L i into the most significant n/2 bits is ≤ k − 1. This completes the description of one reduction.
To describe the whole protocol, consider the tree T N corresponding to repeating the above reduction. Each internal node is labeled with a Sum-Greater instance and its associated CM instance. Each leaf is labeled with a Sum-Greater instance only. This tree has depth lg n and each internal node has k edges, each labeled with one of the (k − 1) + 1 possible answers to the CM problem at the node.
Our efficient protocol works on another tree which we denote T . T is obtained from T N be replacing each leaf with a sufficiently long chain, say of length n. The high-level structure of T is depicted in Figure 1 . A more detailed and partial view of T is in Figure 2 . Each node on the chain is labeled only with the same Sum-Greater instance as the leaf in T N it corresponds to.
The good path is defined as the root-leaf path where we follow edges corresponding to the values of CM . We now claim that during an error-prone execution, the players can verify if the node they reached is along the good path, with constant communication and constant error.
Claim 18. Let v be a node in T . Consider the path taking the root to v. Suppose that if it follows an edge labeled ⊥, then the corresponding CM problem has indeed value ⊥. Then the players can decide if v is along the good path with communication O(k lg k) and error 1%. Here Player i knows x i , n, s, and the path.
Proof: Since the edges labeled ⊥ are taken correctly, we just need to verify all other edges. Let there be of them. The j-th such edge is labeled with a value h j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2} that corresponds to an equation y j i = u j := t j − h j . We need to verify that j≤ i≤k
Figure 2: Low-level view of tree T for k = 3. We show the Sum-Greater instances at distance 1 from the root, and also along a path. This is reduced to verifying the single equation
for a large enough value C that "pads" the numbers to avoid the carry from one sum to interfere with another sum. The players can determine C without communication. Note this is the same as the Sum-Equal instance i≤k j≤
which can be verified with the protocol for Sum-Equal. Note Player i can compute privately j≤ C j · y j i from x i and the path. Alternatively, the players use the public randomness to select a random subset W of the equations, and check their sum. This gives error probability ≤ 51% which can be amplified by repetition.
We can now complete the description of the protocol. The players perform a random walk on T of length w := b lg(n/ ), for an appropriate constant b to be determined below, as follows. Upon entering a node, they first verify that the node lies along the good path via Claim 18. If the answer is negative, they backtrack, that is, they move to the parent of the node. If the answer is affirmative they proceed as follows. If they are not on a chain, they solve the corresponding CM problem via Claim 17, and move to the corresponding children. If on a chain, they move on to the child. At the end of the walk: if the players are on a chain, they output the solution of the corresponding O(1)-size instance; if not, it does not matter.
Bounding the communication. By Claim 18 and 17, the communication is
Correctness. To establish correctness we only need to bound the probability of ending up in the correct chain. Consider the leaf along the good path. Mark each node with the distance from that leaf in T . Note that it is enough that at the end of the walk we have decreased our starting distance by ≥ lg n, since in that case we must be on the correct chain. Note that at each step we have ≥ 98% probability of decreasing the distance. Since we take w = b lg(n/ ) steps, by a chernoff bound, for a suitably large b, with probability ≥ 1 − we have increased the distance at most 3%w steps. In this case we have decreased the distance by at least w − 2 · 3%w ≥ lg n, for a large enough b.
To conclude, we verify that Nisan and Safra's protocol does not determine the most significant bit where i≤k x i and s differ. By setting some x i to 0 one can reach the same conclusion for i∈I x i and s − i∈Ī x i for any I. Consider the execution of the protocol on a k-player Sum-Greater instance where s = 0 and for x i ∈ {0, 1} n , i x M i = 2 n/2 − 1. The protocol will focus on x M i and s M , ignoring the least significant bits. This is indeed sufficient to solve the instance, but gives no information on the most significant bit where i x i and s differ, which depends on the carry of i x L i into the most significant bits.
Polynomial-threshold functions
In this section we collect the pieces to prove the following upper bound for polynomialthreshold functions:
Number-on-forehead sums under any partition
The variant of Sum-Equal where the numbers are on the players' foreheads, rather then in their hands, is studied in the seminal paper [CFL83] by Chandra, Furst, and Lipton. [CFL83] gives a characterization of the deterministic communication complexity in terms of certain Ramsey numbers, in particular obtaining an ω(1) lower bound for any fixed number k of players.
For randomized, public-coin protocols, the problem reduces to 2-player equality, and the communication drops to O(1).
We note that this efficient protocol exploits the specific partition. We ask what happens under different partitions.
We show that for any k ≤ 10 4 , k players can decide if i≤k x i = −1 modulo 2 n with O(1) communication, under every partition. And so in particular k + 1 players can decide if i≤k x i = s with O(1) communication. A partition for which this result may be surprising is the one in which Player j misses the -th bit of every number for every ≡ j modulo k. The result may hold for every k. The current proof however does show that for every d there is a k such that k players can decide i≤d x i = s modulo 2 n under any partition.
Theorem 19. For every n and k ≤ 10 4 , and for every partition of [n · k] in k inputs, there is a number-on-forehead protocol that given x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ {0, 1} n decides if i x i = −1 modulo 2 n with communication O(k lg 1/ ) and error .
The proof uses the two-out-of-three construction (reference wanted) to reduce the sum of k elements to the sum of 2 elements whose bits are GF(2) polynomials of degree < k in the inputs. We then compare the inner products of these polynomials with a public random string, which are again GF(2) polynomials. Håstad and Goldmann show in [HG91] that these can be computed with the desired resources.
Claim 20 (Two-out-of-three; reference wanted). For every n there are maps f, g : ({0, 1} n ) 3 → {0, 1} n such that: (1) Each output bit of f is a linear polynomial over GF(2); (2) Each output bit of g is a quadratic polynomial over GF(2); (3) For every x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ {0, 1} n , f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) + 2g(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 .
Proof: The i-th bit of f is the xor of the i-th bits of x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 . The i-th bit of g is the majority of the i-th bits of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , corresponding to the carries of the sum x 1 + x 2 + x 3 . Majority over 3 bits has degree 2.
Proof of Theorem 19:
Iterating the construction in Claim 20, we end up with two multi-bit polynomial maps p(x 1 , . . . , x k ) and q(x 1 , . . . , x k ) with the property that, letting a := p(x) and b := q(x) be the integers whose binary representation is given by p(x) and q(x), a + b = i x i . By always applying the claim to the three numbers with least degree, we verified with computer search that each output bit of p and q has degree < k for every k ≤ 10 4 . We want to verify that a + b = −1 modulo 2 n . Hence we can consider the n least significant bits of a and b. We also note that −1 − b just amounts to complementing the bits of b. So we see that we want to verify if, restricted to the n least significant bits, p(x) =q(x), where the i-bit ofq(x) is the i-th bit of q(x) plus one modulo 2. For this task the players compare p(x), r and q(x), r , where ., . denotes inner product, and r is a public random string. For fixed r, this amounts to computing publicly available GF(2) polynomials p(x), r , q(x), r : ({0, 1} n ) k → {0, 1} on an input x. These polynomials are sums of polynomials of degree < k and hence also have degree < k. Each can be computed by k players under any partition of the input by sending 1 bit per player. [HG91] 
Lower bounds
In this section we prove our lower bounds for the Sum-Equal and Sum-Greater problems. Our lower bounds hold even for the special case s = 0. Common to many of the proofs is the following standard fact about protocols inducing decompositions by monochromatic rectangles, cf. [KN97, Lemma 1.16].
Claim 21. A k-player (number-in-hand) deterministic protocol using communication ≤ c partitions the inputs in C ≤ 2 c sets of inputs R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R C such that (1) the protocol outputs the same value on inputs in the same set, and (2) the sets are rectangles: each R i can be written as
is a subset of the inputs of Player j.
When dealing with rectangles, we use the notation
for the first k − 1 coordinates.
We also recall that we can amplify the success probability of a protocol to any constant by increasing the communication by a corresponding constant factor. Hence we can and will prove our lower bounds under the assumption that the error probability is, say, 1%.
Sum-Greater
Theorem 6. The communication complexity of 2-player Sum-Greater is Ω(lg n).
Proof
Let Π be a randomized protocol with error ≤ 1% that on input (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n decides if x 1 ≥ x 2 . (The Sum-Greater problem is about deciding x 1 > −x 2 . The current variant is sufficient and slightly more convenient for the lower bound.) We show that if the protocol uses c < γ lg n bits of communication, for a sufficiently small constant γ, we reach a contradiction.
We define two distributions G = (G 1 , G 2 ) and B = (B 1 , B 2 ) as follows. To obtain a sample G = (G 1 , G 2 ), let G 1 be a uniform n-bit number. Then select I ∈ [n] uniformly, and let G 2 be equal to G 1 but with all bits less significant than the I-th set to 0.
To obtain a sample B = (B 1 , B 2 ), again let B 1 be a uniform n-bit number. Then again select I ∈ [n] uniformly. Now let B 2 be equal to B 1 but with the I-th bit complemented, and all bits less significant than the I-th set to 0.
Note G 1 and B 1 are the same distribution. Pictorially, if G 1 = B 1 = X 1 X 2 . . . X n , where X 1 is the most significant bit, we can write
Now observe that G 1 ≥ G 2 always, while B 1 ≥ B 2 with probability 1/2 exactly when the I-th bit of B 1 is 1. By an averaging argument, there exists a deterministic protocol Π that gives the correct answer on the distribution G/2 + B/2 except with error probability ≤ 1%. In particular, the error is ≤ 2% on each of G and B. We obtain 
We will reach a contradiction by showing that, for small enough γ,
Indeed, together with equations (4) and (5), Equation (6) gives the contradiction
To show Equation (6) we prove the following lemma.
In fact the lemma holds under the weaker assumption that Pr[G ∈ R] ≥ 1/2 n α for a suitable constant α.
We now claim the above Lemma 22 implies Equation (6). Indeed, for i = 1, 2, . . .
n , be the C ≤ 2 c rectangles obtained applying Claim 21 to the deterministic protocol Π . Further let R be the subset of these rectangles on which Π outputs 1. Recalling C ≤ 2 γ lg n , note:
(by disjointness of the rectangles)
So it only remains to prove Lemma 22 to conclude the proof of the theorem. We denote by ∆(X, Y ) the statistical distance between two distributions. For a distribution X and an event E, we denote by X|E the distribution of X conditioned on E. The shannon entropy of X is denoted H(X). We recall the following facts:
Fact 23 (Chapter 3, Exercise 17 in [CK82] ). Let V be a random variable taking values in a set S. Let U be a uniform variable over S. Then: ∆(V, U ) ≤ 4 lg |S| − H(V ).
Fact 24. Let V be a random variable taking values in a set S. Let U be a uniform variable over S. Let π : S → S be a permutation. Then ∆(V, π(V )) ≤ 2∆(V, U ).
We use the above in the simple case where S = {0, 1} and π(V ) = 1 − V .
Fact 25. Let V, W be two random variables, and let E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E t be mutually exclusive events. Then,
Proof of Lemma 22:
Fix such a large rectangle R. We shall prove the inequality
from which we easily obtain the lemma as follows:
(Since G 1 and B 1 are equal)
To show ( ), we shall prove that
n ≥ 1/n. Denote by X <i the variables X 1 X 2 . . . X i−1 . By the chain rule of entropy,
Denoting by I a uniform choice for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have
We can now bound:
= O(1) (lg n)/n (By Equation (7))
(for large enough n.)
Sum-Equal modulo a prime
In this section we prove our lower bound for the Sum-Equal problem modulo a prime p.
Theorem 26. The communication complexity of k-player Sum-Equal modulo p a prime between k 1/4 and 2k 1/4 is Ω(k lg k).
The same lower bound holds modulo any number that has a prime factor ≥ k Ω(1) . (Details omitted.)
Proof of Theorem 26
Let Π be a randomized protocol with error ≤ 1/3 for the k-player Sum-Equal modulo p problem with s = 0. We show that if the protocol uses c < γk lg k bits of communication, for a sufficiently small constant γ, we reach a contradiction. By decreasing γ, we can and will assume that k is sufficiently large.
We define two distributions G and B:
for uniform and independent G i , B i ∈ Z p . Note Π(G) is supposed to output 1 while Π(B) is supposed to output 0. Also note G −k and B −k are the same distribution.
By an averaging argument, there exists a deterministic protocol Π that gives the correct answer on the distribution G/2 + B/2 except with error probability ≤ 1%. In particular,
We will contradict this fact by showing that, for small enough γ,
Indeed this is a contradiction because equations (8) and (10) imply Pr B [Π (B) = 1] ≥ 0.5 · 98% − 1% = 48% > 2%, contradicting Equation (9). To show Equation (10) we prove a lemma. For i = 1, 2, . . .
c rectangles obtained applying Claim 21 to the deterministic protocol Π . Further let R be the subset of these rectangles on which Π outputs 1.
The above Lemma 27 implies Equation (10) because:
(by disjointness of the rectangles) ≥ 0.5
So it only remains to prove Lemma 27 to conclude the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 27: First note that, for every rectangle R:
We are going to show the inequality
which gives the lemma. First, if R k = ∅ then both probabilities are 0, and we are done.
To handle the more interesting R k = ∅ case, we are going to write the distribution G conditioned on
This implies ( ).
To define the G (v) , note that among the first k − 1 indices there must be a set I of
2γ for every i ∈ I. This is because G 1 , . . . , G k−1 are independent random variables uniform in Z p , and so if there are not that many indices, we would have Pr
2γ implies that |R i | ≥ 2, by making γ sufficiently small and using the fact that p ≥ k 1/4 . Hence, for i ∈ I, G i conditioned on being in R i is a random variable that is uniform on ≥ 2 elements. Any such variable is a convex combination of random variables uniform on 2 elements. (Proof: pick a random pair, output a random element.) Hence we can write G|G −k ∈ R −k as a convex combination of distributions G (v) such that for each v: the first k − 1 coordinates of G (v) are independent, and each is either uniform over two values if it belongs to I, or else it is fixed.
For any v we can write:
where the variables X i are independent variables, and X i is uniform over {a i , b i } for some a i = b i . Note the "−" sign in the definition of G k and B k is incorporated in the a i and b i . We then use the following relatively standard claim, whose proof uses fourier analysis and is below.
Claim 28. Let p be a prime number. Let X be the sum of t independent random variables each uniform over
We apply the claim to our case where X = i≤k/3 X i , t ≥ k/3, and p ≤ 2k 1/4 . This
k + 1 with a uniform random variable in Z p we only lose an additive in probabilities. Hence, recalling |R k | > 0, and letting µ := |R k |/p ≥ 1/p, we get
which is true for sufficiently large k.
This proves the lemma, and hence the theorem, assuming the claim.
Proof of Claim 28: First we use a relatively standard claim that the statistical distance between X and uniform is ≤ 0.5
where e(z) := e 2π √ −1z/p outputs the pth primitive root of unity raised to the input; see e.g. [BV10, §B] .
In our case, for every s, we can write
5(e(a) + e(b))| for some a, b ∈ Z p such that a = b, using the fact that multiplying by s is a permutation modulo p. Letting α := 2πa/p and β := 2πb/p we get: |0.5(e(a) + e(b))| = 0.5 (cos(α) + cos(β)) 2 + (sin(α) + sin(β)) 2 = 0.5(1 + cos(α − β)) (By trigonometric equalities)
So multiplying over the t indices we get
And overall the statistical distance is
Conceivably one can also prove Pr[B ∈ R] ≥ Pr[G ∈ R] − 1%/C. Our proof does not give this. For example when Pr[G −k ∈ R −k ] = Ω(1), because of the loss in Claim 28, our additive error is exponential in k 1−Ω(1) , rather than in c = γk lg k.
Sum-Equal modulo 2 n
In this section we prove our lower bound for the Sum-Equal problem modulo a power of two.
Theorem 29. The communication complexity of k-player Sum-Equal modulo 2
is Ω(k lg k).
The same lower bound holds modulo any power of 2 that is larger than k 1/4 . (Simple details omitted.)
The proof of the above theorem is a bit more complicated than the previous proof of Theorem 26 for the case of Z p , p prime. In particular, the choice of distributions G and B from the previous proof does not work anymore: players can just send the least significant bit.
Proof of Theorem 29
Let N := 2 n = k 1/4 . Let Π be a randomized protocol with error ≤ 1% for the k-player Sum-Equal modulo N problem with s = 0. We define two distributions G and B:
for uniform and independent G i , B i ∈ Z N . Note Π(G) is supposed to output 1 while Π(B) is supposed to output 0. The proof then proceeds like the proof of Theorem 26 until we write
where the variables X i are independent variables, and X i is uniform over {a i , b i } for some
where Y i is uniform over {0, 1}. Since b i − a i ∈ Z N , among the ≥ k/3 indices i ∈ I for which X i takes at least 2 values, we must have t ≥ |I|/N = (k/3)/N = k 3/4 /3 indices I such that for any i ∈ I the value b i − a i is the same value m. Further write G (v) as a convex combination of distributions G [v] where, among the first k − 1 coordinates, only those in I are not fixed. Note G|G −k ∈ R −k is a convex combination of the G [v] . Fix any v and denote G [v] by G . Let S denote the sum of t 0/1 variables. So we can now write
We will show that
The argument is a bit more complicated than for the case of Z p , because we will not be comparing G k and B k to the uniform distribution. Consequently it is not only the size, but the structure of R k that matters.
Write m = d2 b , where d is odd and b < n. And consider the distribution Y := a + 2 b U , where U is uniform over n − b bits.
If Support(Y ) ∩ R k = ∅, then also Support(G k ) ∩ R k = ∅, and so Pr[G k ∈ R k ] = 0 and Equation (12) holds.
Otherwise, Support(Y ) ∩ R k = ∅. Since Y is uniform on its support, µ := Pr[Y ∈ R k ] ≥ 1/N . We show that both distributions G k and B k are ≤ exp(−k Ω(1) ) close to Y . This allows us to obtain Inequality (12) as in the proof of Theorem 26, Inequality (11).
To show closeness, we use the following claim that is similar to Claim 28.
Claim 30. Let N be a power of 2. Let X be the sum of t independent random variables each uniform over {0, 1}. Then X modulo N is ≤ 0.5 √ N e O(t/N 2 ) close to uniform.
In our case t/N
, so the error is bound as desired. To apply the claim to show that both B k and G k are close Y , reason as follows:
Above the symbol ≡ stands for "same distribution," and is the error in statistical distance. The errors come from the claim. And we also use the fact that multiplying by the odd integer d is a permutation modulo any power of 2. This allows us to write dU ≡ U and dU + 2 n−b−1 ≡ U . It only remains to verify Claim 30.
Proof sketch of Claim 30:
The proof is nearly identical to that of Claim 28. We replace p by N throughout. The only conceptual difference is that we write the terms |E X i [e(−sX i )]| as |0.5(e(0) + e(s))|, where recall 0 = s < N . This is the point where we use that X i is boolean as opposed to uniform on two values.
Sum-Equal over the integers
In this section we prove our lower bounds for the Sum-Equal problem over the integers.
Definition 31. A k-player protocol is sententious if Player k speaks only once to announce the output.
Theorem 8. For sententious protocols, the communication complexity of k-player SumEqual over Z is Ω(k lg lg k).
Corollary 9. Let Π be a protocol for k-player Sum-Equal over Z. Then some player must communicate ≥ 0.9 lg lg lg k bits.
We only use the following property of sententious protocols.
Claim 32. Let Π be a deterministic k-player sententious protocol using c bits of communication. Claim 21 holds with the following additional guarantee:
for any i = j such that the protocols outputs 1 on both
In particular, let R the rectangles on which Π outputs 1. Then for every distribution D on inputs:
For general protocols using c bits of communication, the sum in the "in particular" part of the claim can be as large as 2 c .
Proof: Consider the protocol tree. Since the protocol is sententious, each leaf has a sibling that is also a leaf, and the parent corresponds to the single bit sent by Player k. Each rectangle R i is the set of inputs taking to a leaf. Since the protocol outputs two different values on two sibling leaves, one of which may be empty, R i and R j correspond to leaves that are not siblings. R i −k and R j −k are the inputs taking to the parents x and y of these two leaves. Neither the path from x to the root, is an extension of the path from y to the root, nor vice versa. This implies R
The connection with general protocols is the following. Proof: The first k −1 players run 2 c k instances of Π, one for each possible output of Player k. Then Player k can privately decide which run matches its output and announce the output.
Proof of Corollary 9: Suppose there is a protocol in which each player communicates < 0.9 lg lg lg k bits. By Claim 33 there is a sententious protocol with communication (lg lg k) 0.9 · k(0.9 lg lg lg k), violating the Ω(k lg lg k) lower bound in Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8
Let Π be a sententious, randomized protocol with error ≤ 1% for the k-player Sum-Equal over Z problem with s = 0. We show that if the protocol uses c < γk lg lg k bits of communication, for a sufficiently small constant γ, we reach a contradiction. By decreasing γ, we can and will assume that k is sufficiently large.
To define the distributions G and B we need a certain integer t. Let a := γ lg k. Define t to be the smallest number that is divisible by any integer ≤ a.
Proof: Let t := prime p≤a p lg p a . Clearly any number less than a divides t, since it is the produce of primes p ≤ a raised to an integer exponent ≤ lg p a. Now bound t ≤ prime p≤a
where π(a) is the number of primes less than a, and π(a) = Θ(a/ lg a) by the prime number theorem.
for uniform and independent G i , B i ∈ {1, . . . , a}. Note Π(G) is supposed to output 1 while Π(B) is supposed to output 0. By an averaging argument, there exists a deterministic protocol Π that gives the correct answer on the distribution G/2 + B/2 except with error probability ≤ 1%. In particular,
Indeed this is a contradiction because equations (13) and (15) 
rectangles obtained applying Claim 32 to the deterministic, sententious protocol Π . Further let R be the subset of these rectangles on which Π outputs 1.
Note the above Lemma 35 implies Equation (15):
Proof of Lemma 27:
We are going to prove the equivalent fact that
As before, we are going to write the distribution G|G −k ∈ R −k as a convex combination of distributions G [v] , and argue that, for each v, Pr[G
To define the G [v] , let := 2/a = 2/γ lg k. Let R = R 1 × R 2 × · · · × R k be a rectangle where Pr[G ∈ R] ≥ 1%/C. This means that there must be ≥ k/3 coordinates
where the strict inequality holds for any γ < 1/2 and sufficiently large k.
Hence, in a fashion analogous to the proof of Theorem 29, we can write G conditioned on G −k ∈ R −k as a convex combinations of distributions G [v] such that, for any v, letting G := G [v] : This yields that the distributions
for a sufficiently small γ > 0.
We make some remarks about the above proof of the lower bound for sententious protocols. First, we note that the lower bound is proved for numbers G i , i < k, of ≤ lg lg k bits. Nisan's protocol gives a simultaneous protocol where each player sends O(k lg(lg lg k+lg k)) = O(k lg lg k). So our proof is tight for the distributions used, and to beat our lower bound one must use numbers on (lg k) ω(1) bits. We also note that picking t small, or uniformly at random in an interval of integers, does not work: the players can just announce the numbers modulo a comparably small prime.
Pseudorandom functions
In this section we prove our results for pseudorandom functions. We start with the distinguisher for AC 0 circuits augmented with few threshold (or arbitrary symmetric) gates. Then we give our candidate pseudorandom function computable by AC 0 circuits with Mod m gates.
Distinguisher for AC
0 with few threshold (or arbitrary symmetric) gates Theorem 10. Let F be a distribution on functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} such that each function in the support is computable by a circuit of size n d , depth d, with d threshold (or arbitrary symmetric) gates, where d is a constant and n is sufficiently large.
We define the k-player norm.
The next lemma shows that if we can compute f well on average using little communication, then R k (f ) is large. (Note the contrapositive is used [VW08] .)
Lemma 38 (Corollary 3.11 in [VW08] ). Let f : ({0, 1} n ) k → {−1, 1} be a function. Let Π : ({0, 1} n ) k → {−1, 1} be a function computable by a k-player number-on-forehead protocol using c bits of communication. Then
where the expectation is over a uniform x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) k .
Proof of Theorem 10:
We call a gate special if it computes a threshold or an arbitrary symmetric function.
The distinguisher. The distinguisher D on oracle f : {0, 1} n → {−1, 1} depends on two constants k and h which depend on d and will be bound later. D begins with selecting a random restriction ρ which leaves free exactly √ n variables. All queries to f are masked by this restriction, so that D is querying the restricted oracle f := f | ρ : {0, 1} √ n → {0, 1}. Then D divides the √ n free variables into k blocks of size := √ n/k. It then computes an approximation α to R k (f ). Recall that R k (f ) is an expectation of a random variable in {−1, 1}. D takes s := n 2h+1 samples (i.e., a value of the argument of the expectation for a random, uniform choice for the variables in the subscript) and defines α as their average. Each sample can be computed in time poly(n, 2 k ) = poly(n). So α can be computed in time poly(n). D accepts iff α ≥ 1/n h .
Analysis for random functions. In the case that f comes from the uniform distribution U , note that even the restricted oracle f is uniform. The expectation of the k-player norm over f is zero except in the case that x 0 i = x 1 i for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. By a union bound, the expectation of the k-player norm is ≤ k2 − . Hence the probability over f that the norm is ≥ 0.5/n h is o(1). When the norm is ≤ 0.5/n h , by a chernoff bound the probability that the approximation α is ≥ 1/n h is at most 2 −D(1/2+0.25/n h +0.25/n h ||1/2+0.25/n h )s ≤ 2 −2(0.25/n h ) 2 s ≤ o(1).
Hence the distinguisher accepts with probability o(1).
Analysis for circuit functions. W.l.o.g. assume the output gate is special. Consider the ≤ d2 d subcircuits C obtained by taking a special gate as a root, and fixing all other special gates to any possible value.
Each circuit in C has 1 special gate taking as input ≤ n d AC 0 circuits. Consider the ≤ d2 d n d AC 0 circuits that feed into the special gate in some circuit in C. For a constant k depending on d, by the switching lemma [Hås87] with probability 1 − o(1) all these circuits will collapse to decision trees of depth k −1. (One can use the version of the switching lemma in [Bea94] , and apply it iteratively along the lines of the proof of [BS90, Theorem 3.6].) By writing a decision tree as a DNF, noting that no two terms accept the same input, we see that each circuit in C, after the restriction, is computable by either a polynomial-threshold function with degree k − 1, or a function of the output of a polynomial of degree k − 1 with polynomially-bounded coefficients. (The latter is a.k.a. Sym•And k−1 .) By using Theorem 5 in the case of threshold gates, and [HG91, Lemma 4] in the case of arbitrary symmetric gates, each circuit in C, after the restriction, can be computed with error probability ≤ 1%/d by a k-player number-on-forehead protocol with O(lg n) communication.
By computing one special gate at the time, we have a protocol with communication dO(lg n) = O(lg n) and error ≤ 1% for f . By Lemma 38,
for a constant h depending on k and d.
By a chernoff bound, the probability that the approximation α is less than 1/n α is ≤ 2 −D(1/2+1/n h −0.5/n h ||1/2+1/n h )s ≤ 2 −2(0.5/n h ) 2 s ≤ o(1).
Hence the distinguisher accepts with probability ≥ 1 − o(1).
Candidate pseudorandom function in AC 0 with Mod m gates
We now construct candidate PRF computable by poly-size constant-depth AC 0 circuits with Mod m gates, for any m. Here a Mod m gate outputs 1 iff the hamming weight of the input is divisible by m.
Such pseudorandom functions can be built from any PRF candidate f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} in space O(lg n), or even NL, with security 2
n Ω(1) . We use the TC 0 candidates by Naor and Reingold, later with Rosen, in [NR99, NRR02] . For concreteness we focus on the candidate in [NRR02] which is based on the hardness of factoring. See [NRR02, §4.1,5] for background. For a bound t(n), the t(n)-factoring assumption is the assumption that any algorithm running in time t(n) has success probability ≤ 1/t(n) in factoring a uniformly-chosen n-bit Blum integer N , that is, an integer N that is equal to P · Q for P, Q two primes that are both congruent to 3 modulo 4. Conceivably, there is some > 0 such that the 2 n -factoring assumption holds. In fact, the (exponential) running time in this assumption is the type that is needed for the "Natural Proofs" connection by Razborov and Rudich [RR97] .
Below we construct such hash functions with the desired resources. We now analyze the pseudorandomness of f s,t . First, by enlarging b appropriately to take into account the complexity of computing the hash functions, any algorithm running in time 2
